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Rehabilitating the Medical Board's
Diversion Program

by Julianne D'Angelo Fellmeth

medical licenses) into an in-house, Board-sponsored moni
hat if your doctor were an alcoholic? A drug ad
toring program subsidized with $800,000 annually in licens
dict? What if he stole narcotics from his hospital's
ing fees paid by all California physicians. Participation in the
supply, self-injected while on duty, and practiced
Diversion Program is absolutely confidential; "successful"
medicine while under the influence? 1 Can you think of any
participants are immunized from disciplinary action for self
one more dangerous to wield a scalpel, administer anesthe
abuse of drugs or alcohol; and many physicians enter and
sia, or suture your child?
complete the Program without any interruption whatsoever
Addiction to alcohol or drugs is a chronic, lifelong dis
in their medical practice.
ease in which relapse and recidivism are expected.2 Called
Supporters argue that the Di version Program protects the
"an occupational hazard" for health care professionals by one
public by identifying impaired physicians, providing them
of the nation's leading experts, 3 addiction among physicians
with access to appropriate inter
is a serious and growing problem.
�-- ···-'--·-·--·-·-· ---vention programs and treatment
Physicians may be particularly
services, and monitoring them for
susceptible to substance abuse
Called "an occupational hazard.. for
several years to ensure they have
problems due to the stresses of
health care professionals by one of the
recovered and are consistently ca
working in a health care environ
nation's leading experts.addiction among
pable of safe practice. According
ment, enhanced access to con
p hysicians is a serio us and growing
to Dr. Gene Feldman, who was
trolled substances, and an income
problem.·
president of the Medical Board
level that permits them to pur
during 1980 when the Program
chase drugs if necessary. Alwas created, "the Diversion Program was enacted because a
though the existence of this problem is not disputed, its reach
lot of doctors who came before us in discipline had hurt no
and scope are the subject of some debate:
• "The AMA conservatively estimates that one of every ten
one but themselves through the disease of substance abuse/
chemical dependency. They were being disciplined at an av
practicing physicians in this country becomes seriously
erage cost of $30,000 per case, and most had already gone
impaired."4
into rehabilitation programs and were clean and sober. But
• "The incidence of impaired physicians is much higher than
we
were required to discipline them and ruin their lives."7 Dr.
we had originally perceived. It is apparent now that four
Feldman and others envisioned the Program as being cheaper
teen to fifteen percent of physicians at some point in his
than discipline and more protective of consumers, in that it
or her career will become impaired. Of these impaired
could immediately remove an impaired physician from prac
physicians only six to eight percent have primary psychi
tice
if necessary (whereas the discipline system at that time
5
atric disease."
lacked any meaningful interim remedies).
• "In 1964, Modlin and Montes noted that estimates of the
Has that vision been realized? Over the past five years,
incidence of narcotic addiction in physicians varied from
the Center for Public Interest Law (CPIL) has expressed
30 to 100 times that found in the
repeated concerns about the
general population, and they classi
--··-- --·-- --. ------ --- - --- ----·--"-- , structure, functioning, and
fied such addiction as an occupa
Over the past five years, the Center for
operations of the Medical
tional hazard."6
PubliclnterestLaw(CPIL)hasexpressed
Board's Diversion ProWhat if the Medical Board-the
. repeated con()erns about the stru_cture\ "' gram. 8 CPIL has registered
state agency charged with consumer
f'llnction.ing!aqdoperaticms ofthet,ledic�
several levels of concern
protection as its highest priority-knew
Board's Diversion Prog ':'ffl�
; l about the Program, ranging
about such physicians, refused to tell ________ -------··•·· ______________________ ,
, ___J from the philosophical to
consumers, and let those physicians
the structural to the opera
continue to practice medicine while attempting rehabilitation
tional. In 1998, the Board's Division of Medical Quality
and recovery?
finally created a task force to investigate CPIL's claims. To
Meet the Diversion Program of the Medical Board of
assist that task force, the Medical Board, and the California
California. This legislatively-created program "diverts" phy
Legislature in reforming this program which is of critical
sicians who are abusing or addicted to drugs or alcohol from
importance to patient protection, we present the following
the disciplinary track (which might revoke or suspend their
facts and criticisms.
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Diversion Program
Purpose and Structure

The Medical Board of California (MBC) is the state agency
charged with regulating physicians.9 MBC licenses physicians, 10
establishes standards for the practice of medicine in Califor
nia, 11 and enforces those standards through its enforcement
program. 12 By statute, MBC consists of twelve physicians and
seven non-physicians. 1 3 Seventeen of the Board's nineteen
members (including all of the physician members) are appointed
by the Governor; one public member is appointed by the Sen
ate Rules Committee, and the remaining public member is ap
pointed by the Assembly Speaker. 14 MBC is divided into two
autonomous divisions: the Division of Licensing (DOL) and
the Division of Medical Quality (DMQ). 15
DMQ is responsible for overseeing the Board's enforce
ment program, which receives and investigates complaints
against licensed physicians, 16 and directs the Health Quality
Enforcement Section within the Attorney General's Office17
to file formal charges and prosecute disciplinary cases against
physicians at evidentiary hearings presided over by adminis
trative law judges of the Office of Administrative Hearings. 18
Following the hearing, DMQ members review proposed de
cisions written by ALJs and make final disciplinary deci
sions. 1 9 DMQ also adopts regulations and establishes policy
governing MBC's enforcement program. 20
DMQ is also charged with establishing criteria for and
overseeing the operation of the Board's Diversion Program.21
The Legislature created the Diversion Program in 1980 and
charged it with "identifying and rehabilitating physi
cians...with impairment due to abuse of dangerous drugs or
alcohol...affecting competency so that physicians...so afflicted
may be treated and returned to the practice of medicine in a
manner which will not endanger the public health and
safety."22 The Legislature further specified its intent about the
priorities of the Diversion Program in 1990, when it enacted
Business and Professions Code section 2229; that provision
states that "[p]rotection of the public shall be the highest pri
ority for the Division of Medical Quality.... Where rehabilita
tion and protection are inconsistent, protection shall be para
mount."23
How does the Diversion Program work? Physicians who
abuse drugs or alcohol may voluntarily "self-refer" into the
Diversion Program, in which case their participation remains
confidential from the Board's Enforcement Program and the
public.24 Alternatively, DMQ may require a physician to par
ticipate in the Diversion Program as a condition of probation
or in settlement of a disciplinary proceeding.25 The Program
enters into an individualized contract with each participant.
The contract may require the participant to temporarily cease
the practice of medicine; it also specifies numerous terms and
conditions of participation, including requirements for ran
dom bodily fluid testing, mandatory group meeting atten
dance, physical, psychiatric, psychological, and competency
testing, and worksite monitors if the participant is permit
ted to practice medicine. The goal of the various Diversion
4

Program "players"-all of whom are described below-is to
ensure compliance with the terms of the contract.
Those who "successfully complete the Program"26 are
immune from disciplinary action for self-abuse of drugs or
alcohol, which otherwise is unprofessional conduct and
grounds for discipline by the Board.27 Noncompliance with
the terms of a Diversion Program contract is grounds for ter
mination from the Program, and risks exposure to disciplin
ary action for self-abuse of drugs and alcohol under Business
and Professions Code section 2239.28

The "Players"

Division of Medical Quality

Unlike diversion programs for substance-abusing licens
ees at other California occupational licensing agencies, the
Legislature structured the Medical Board's program to be
operated and administered internally. With regard to the Di
version Program, DMQ is expressly charged with the follow
ing duties:
• ensuring that protection of the public is the Program's
highest priority ("where rehabilitation and protection are
inconsistent, protection shall be paramount");29
• establishing regional Diversion Evaluation Committees
(see below) and appointing their members;30
• establishing criteria for "the acceptance, denial, or termina
tion of physicians" from the Diversion Program;31
• establishing criteria for the selection of "administrative
physicians" who examine physicians requesting admis
sion into the Diversion Program;32
• requiring each Diversion Evaluation Committee to sub
mit a biannual report including information concerning
the number of cases accepted, denied, or terminated with
compliance or noncompliance, and a cost analysis of the
program";33 and
• "administering the provisions" of the statutes creating the
Diversion Program.34
Thus, the Division of Medical Quality retains policy
making authority over the Diversion Program. However, it
has no role in decisionmaking as to individual participants
or the terms of their Diversion Program contracts. 35 This im
portant function of the Diversion Program is carried out by
local-level Diversion Evaluation Committees.
Diversion Evaluation Committees

The Diversion Evaluation Committees (DECs) are re
gional committees created in statute. 36 Currently, a total of
five DECs operate in California; two convene in the Berke
ley area, and three in Los Angeles. DEC members are ap
pointed by DMQ. DECs must consist of three licensed physi
cians and two non-physicians;37 all DEC members must have
"experience or knowledge in the evaluation or management
of persons who are impaired due to alcohol or drug abuse .... "38
DECs meet quarterly, and are charged by statute with the fol
lowing activities:
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• evaluating physicians who request participation in the
Diversion Program;
• reviewing and designating treatment facilities to which Di
version Program participants may be referred;
• receiving and reviewing information concerning physi
cians participating in the Diversion Program;
• considering whether a participant "may with safety con
tinue or resume the practice of medicine";
• setting forth a written treatment program for each par
ticipant, including requirements for group meeting atten
dance and other "supervision and surveillance";
• holding "a general meeting at least twice a year, which
shall be open and public," to evaluate the Program's
progress, review data required to be included in reports to
DMQ, prepare reports to be submitted to DMQ, and sug
gest proposals for changes in the Program;39 and
• submitting to DMQ a biannual report which includes "in
formation concerning the number of cases accepted, de
nied, or terminated with compliance or noncompliance, and
a cost analysis of the program."40
The DECs' decisionmaking about individual Diversion
Program participants is informed and assisted by Diversion
Program staff on several levels: (1) local group facilitators
who conduct group meetings with Program participants; (2)
regional case managers who monitor each participant's com
pliance with the terms of his/her contract; and (3) Sacramento
based Program management staff.

Group Facilitators
All Diversion Program contracts include required atten
dance at local meetings conducted by Diversion Program
group facilitators. Group facilitators are independent contrac
tors to the Medical Board, not Board employees. Every week
across the state,41 fourteen ( 1 4) group facilitators hold meet
ings of six to twelve participants. Depending on their con
tract terms, participants may be required to attend one or two
group meetings per week. According to the Diversion
Program's policy and procedure manual, group facilitators
are expected to provide "recovery-oriented psychotherapy
which focuses on the use of 1 2-step programs."42 Group fa
cilitators are paid directly by participants at the rate of $235
per month for two meetings per week, or $ 1 65 for one meet
ing per week. The facilitators are responsible for convening
and facilitating group meetings, recording attendance, observ
ing participants for signs of substance abuse, ensuring the
collection of urine samples for testing, and reporting atten
dance and suspected compliance problems to regional Diver
sion Program case managers.43
Case Managers
Currently, the Program employs five case managers, each
of whom monitors case files on a caseload of 50-60 Diver
sion Program participants in a specified geographical area;
case managers are currently based in Sacramento, the Bay
Area, San Bernardino, Glendale, and Orange County. The case

managers receive and review urine test results and reports
from group facilitators, hospital well-being committees, and
worksite monitors, and ensure that all participants in their
caseloads are complying with the terms of their Diversion
Program contracts. According to the Diversion Program's
policy and procedure manual, case managers are also required
to personally interview applicants for admission into the Di
version Program in their assigned geographical area; attend
group meetings in their geographical area at least once every
two months in order to personall y observe Program partici
pants and the group facilitators' performance; and attend DEC
meetings when a participant in their caseload appears before
the Committee.44

Program Manager
The Sacramento-based Diversion Program Manager is a
full-time civil service employee of the Medical Board respon
sible for the overall administration of the Diversion Program.
The Program Manager directly supervises compliance activi
ties, data collection, and the activities of all Diversion Pro
gram case managers and group facilitators.
Liaison Committee to the Diversion Program
In addition to all the various "players" described above,
the Medical Board has added another layer of input not au
thorized by statute. Shortly after enactment of the law creat
ing the Diversion Program, DMQ and the California Medical
Association (CMA) established the "Liaison Committee to
the Diversion Program." The Liaison Committee is an advi
sory body charged with serving as (a) "an information shar
ing and clarification body regarding Diversion Program poli
cies and procedures; (b) a forum for consideration of infor
mation from outside the Program; and (c) a forum for discus
sion of long-range Program plans."45
The Liaison Committee membership includes the chair
of each regional Diversion Evaluation Committee; represen
tatives of Diversion Program and MBC executive staff, the
California Medical Association (CMA), and the California
Society of Addiction Medicine (CSAM); and two members
of DMQ.46 The Liaison Committee meets quarterly in pri
vate. During the public session of each quarterly DMQ meet
ing, the Diversion Program Manager reports recent signifi
cant Liaison Committee actions and recommendations to the
Division of Medical Quality. Generally, Diversion Program
staff simply implement decisions and recommendations of
the Liaison Committee; it is rare for DMQ to review or ratify
a recommendation of the Liaison Committee.47

Major Diversion Program Issues
As noted above, CPIL is concerned about the Diversion
Program on many levels. At the most basic level, DMQ and
the Diversion Program have wholly failed to comply with sev
eral statutory requirements for the past 1 8 years. For example:
• Since 1 980, Business and Professions Code section
2350(h) has required DMQ to establish criteria for the se
lection of "administrative physicians"-physicians who
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ability. DMQ is not authorized to delegate its policymaking
are assigned to perform medical and psychiatric exami
role to private parties, especially in the absence of statutory
nations of prospective Diversion Program participants.48
authorization. Yet it has undeniably done just that-Diver
DMQ has never adopted those criteria, and has devel
sion Program staff interpret Liaison Committee directives and
oped no training materials to adequately convey Diver
recommendations as orders, and
sion Program policies, priori
implement them without review or
ties, and procedures to new ad
No DEC has ��bmitted a report
ratification
by DMQ. 50
ministrative physicians.
section 2350(1) for at least the past five
Due to DMQ's lack of inter
• Since 1 980, Business and Pro
years. Neither Diversion Program staff nor
est,
the
Diversion Program lacks
DMQ has ever required one.
fessions Code section 2350(i)
an
overall
guiding philosophy
has required the DECs to sub
which
demonstrably
protects con
mit biannual reports to DMQ
sumers
from
the
Medical
Board's
most
dangerous
licensees,
detailing the number of cases accepted, denied, or termi
as
required
by
Business
and
Professions
Code
section
2229.
nated with compliance or noncompliance, and analyzing
It
Jacks
protocols
and
standards
to
guide
the
decisions
and
the cost of the program. No DEC has submitted a report
actions
of
the
DECs,
the
Program
Manager,
the
case
managunder section 2350(i) for at least the past five years. Nei
ers, and the group facilitators. The
ther Diversion Program staff
Program's
enabling act is outdated
nor DMQ has ever required
Due to DMQ's lack of interest, the Diversion and vague; its implementing regu
one.
Program lacks an overall guiding philosophy lations, adopted by DMQ in 198 1 ,
• Since 1 980, Business and Pro which demonstrably protects consumers from
are minimal and merely nonsub
fessions Code section 2352(g) the Medical Board's most dangerous licensees, stantive restatements of the stat
has required each DEC to hold as required by Business and Professions Code ute; its policy and procedure
a public meeting twice a year. section 2229.
manual is not law, and DMQ has
CPIL has been on the Medical
established no mechanisms to deBoard's mailing list for 1 8
termine or measure compliance with it. No member of DMQ
years; not once has any DEC ever published notice of
is familiar with the operations of the Program. DMQ has al
such a meeting. Neither Diversion Program staffnor DMQ
lowed the Program to flounder-unsupervised and standard
has ever required the DECs to comply with this requireless-for 19 years.
ment.
This criticism is not new, and CPIL is not the first to level
it.
Three
audits during the 1980s all found that the Diversion
These requirements are statutory, and the Medical Board
Program
fails
to adequately monitor drug- and alcohol-depen
should either comply with them or sponsor legislation to
dent
physicians-the
raison d 'etre of the Program.51 As far
change the statutes. However, even full compliance with these
back as 1 982, the state Auditor General found serious defi
statutes would fail to address the four major flaws of the
ciencies with the Diversion Program, and opined that they
Diversion Program, which are briefly summarized as follows.
stem "from the lack of established standards and guidelines
DMQ's Failure to Properly Oversee the
for terminating participants" and that, "in particular, [the
Diversion Program
Medical Board] has not clarified the requirement that a physician be terminated from the program when that physician is
Business and Professions Code section 2346 unambigudeemed too great a risk to public health....[Consequently,] there
ously delegates DMQ with the responsibility for overseeing
is no assurance that the public is being adequately protected
the Diversion Program, for establishing its guiding philosoduring the process of rehabilitating physicians."52 In 1985, the
phy, goals, and protocols, and for adopting regulations and
Auditor General repeated this criticism, and described an asadministrative policies to guide its day-to-day activities. However, DMQ has never taken own- .----------�- _ _ _____ _ .. .
tounding example of this critical
failure: "On four separate occaership of this program. Instead, it
Three audits during the I fSOs all found that
sions over a three-month period,
created the Liaison Committee in
the Diversion Program fails to adequately
urine samples collected from the
1982 and has-for all intents and
monitor drug- aR d al cohol-dependent
participant during his office hours
purposes-abdicated its policy_· tre of the Program.
Physicians-the raison d'e
revealed that he was under the inmaking role and administrative
-· -- --- ---·· ------ ...., fluence of alcohol."53 Yet the Proauthority over the Program to that ' ---gram Manager failed to suspend the physician from practicCommittee. DMQ's "oversight" of the Diversion Program
ing medicine, and failed to terminate the physician from Proconsists of its receipt and review of a two-page statistical
gram participation.54
report submitted by Program staff at each quarterly DMQ
To this day, DMQ has taken no meaningful actions to
meeting, and its routine approval of staff and Liaison Comestablish such standards or otherwise clarify its philosophy
mittee nominations for DEC vacancies.49
about the Diversion Program. It has failed to establish or even
As noted above, the Liaison Committee is composed
largely of private citizens; it meets infrequently and in pridiscuss criteria which justify termination from the Program,
vate, insulated from public scrutiny, comment, and accountany policy whatsoever for the Program's approach toward
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simply follow the DECs' orders, made without the benefit of
any clear guidelines or regulations established by DMQ.
And because the operations of the Diversion Program
are shrouded in secrecy, no one is able to adequately monitor
its effectiveness. We are left to rely on "spin" articles written
by staff and Liaison Committee members,55 incomplete sta
tistical data,56 and a misleading "success rate" constantly trum
peted by the Program.57
DMQ must gain control of the Diversion Program. It, or
an active subset of it (such as a Standing Committee on the
Diversion Program), must engage in major policy and proce
dural decisionmaking and establish monitoring mechanisms
Fragmented Nature of Program Decisionmaking
to gauge staff's adherence to those policies and procedures.
As described above, Diversion Program decisionmakDMQ also must seek legislative repeal of the statutes which
ing-both as to policy and indi- ---- ----- -----· ___ ···--· _ ___
permit the DECs to determine the
vidual participants-is subject to
terms and conditions of Diversion
f
o
These locaJ committees--composed
input from a variety of levels:
Program contracts and to make
private parties--are shooting from the
DMQ, the Liaison Committee, the
'. standardless, unsupervised decihip in an attempt to deaJ with the state's
DECs, group facilitators, and Di· sions about individual Program
·. most dangerous physicians. __
_
version Program staff. Each of
participants.
these levels suffers from major flaws. Although DMQ has been
The Program Permits Private Parties to Exercise
delegated the major policymaking role, it has withdrawn and
State Police Power
effectively redelegated that function to the Liaison Commit
tee, whose role is nonstatutory and uncertain.
Perhaps the most serious structural problem of the Di
As to the contents of individual participants' contracts
version Program lies in the fact that its enabling act delegates
and decisionmaking regarding their compliance with those
state police power decisionmaking authority to private par
contracts, the statute delegates major responsibility to the
ties. As will be discussed below, this statute is void as uncon
DECs. This is an unfortunate selection. These committees
stitutional and as inconsistent with federal antitrust law.
composed of private citizens-meet on the local level, infre
As noted above, Business and Professions Code section
quently, and in private. Although they are composed of indi
2352 authorizes the DECs to engage in several activities, most
viduals knowledgeable of chemical dependency, their deci
of which are advisory or recommendatory. However, section
sions are made in a vacuum. Because DMQ has failed to adopt
2352(e) authorizes the DECs to "consider in the case of each
any standards to guide DEC decisionmaking, inconsistency
physician ...participating in the program whether he or she may
is almost assured. Because DEC decisions are not reported or
with safety continue or resume the practice of medicine," and
recorded in any way, no DEC has
section 2352(f) authorizes the
any idea how another DEC has
DECs to "set forth in writing... a
acted in a similar case. Because I PerHaps the most serious structuraJ problem I treabnent program established for
neither DMQ nor Program staff of the Diversion Program lies in the fact that ! each physician ... with the require
review or ratify DEC decisions, ijs e,aabling act delegates state police. power i ments for supervision and surveil
the Program lacks a structural · decisionmaking authority to private parties.
lance." These provisions have
check on inconsistent or errone
been interpreted by the Diversion
ous decisions. And because the DECs have failed to comply
Program to confer absolute, autonomous, and unreviewable
with Business and Professions Code section 2350(i) by sub
decisionmaking authority on the DECs as to the terms and
mitting biannual statistical reports, neither Program staff nor
conditions of each participant's contract, including whether
DMQ is able to comprehensively monitor the actions of the
the physician is permitted to practice medicine.58 The DECs
Program. These local committees--composed of private par
also decide the point at which a participant has either "gradu
ties-are shooting from the hip in an attempt to deal with the
ated"59 or should be "terminated unsuccessfully" from the Pro
state's most dangerous physicians. Neither DMQ nor the Di
gram.60 No member of the Medical Board or its staff reviews
version Program can assure patients and consumers that the
or ratifies the DECs' decisionmaking.
Program's decisionmaking as to these physicians is swift, ef
A determination of the terms and conditions of an occufective, and consistent, as expressly required by Business and
pational license is clearly the exercise of state police power
Professions Code sections 2229 and 2340.
authority-which exercise is reserved to government officials,
The staff of the Program-the Program Manager and the
not private parties. As such, subsections 2352(e) and (f) vio
late two key legal doctrines: ( 1 ) They improperly delegate
five case managers located all over the state-receive and
state police power decisionmaking authority to private par
transmit information from the group facilitators, the DECs,
ties-a violation of the constitutional principle of separation
and the Liaison Committee. But staff make no decisions.
of powers; and (2) they violate federal antitrust law in that
According to staff, decisions are made by the DECs; staff

physicians who relapse into drug or alcohol use, or criteria
for required practice cessation. It has failed to address any of
the serious operational flaws which have been brought to its
attention over the past decade (see below).
The Division must discontinue its delegation of the over
sight of the Diversion Program to the Liaison Committee;
that committee is neither authorized to nor capable of engag
ing in such oversight. DMQ must reestablish itself as admin
istrator of the Diversion Program, clearly communicate that
role to Diversion Program staff, and redefine the role of the
Liaison Committee.

I
I
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they pennit private parties to collude and restrict the access
of a competitor to the marketplace (a "conspiracy to restrain
trade" or "group boycott" in antitrust parlance), without ad
equate state supervision as required by the "state action" ex
ception to antitrust scrutiny.
• Unlawful Delegation to Private Parties. The "unlaw
ful delegation" argument is based upon one of the most fun
damental tenets of our governmental structure-the separa
tion of powers between the three branches of government.
"The doctrine of separation of powers under our form of gov
ernment, which is expressly stated in the constitution, declares
that governmental powers are divided among the three de
partments of government, the legislative, executive, and ju
dicial, and that persons charged with the exercise of one power
may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by
the constitution."61
Explicit in the structure of our government is the notion
that one branch may not perform the powers of another branch,
and may not delegate its governmental powers to another
branch. Implicit in this structure, and a fortiori, is the notion
that all governmental power must be exercised by government
officials, and may not be delegated to non-governmental pri
vate parties. Fundamental governmental police powers must
be exercised by government officials, not by private parties.62
The DECs are composed of private parties. DEC mem
bers are not appointed by the Governor or other elected offi
cials. They are appointed by DMQ, upon nomination by the
Liaison Committee (also composed almost entirely of pri
vate parties). No statute or regulation requires them to take
an oath, file conflict-of-interest statements with the Fair Po
litical Practices Commission, or become aware of circum
stances under which they must recuse themselves from state
decisionmaking. DEC members unilaterally determine the
terms and conditions under which a state licensee may exer
cise that license. Neither the Legislature nor the Division of
Medical Quality has articulated standards to guide the DECs'
exercise of discretion as to the terms of any Diversion Pro
gram contract. The DECs' decisionmaking is not reviewed or
ratified by any member of the Medical Board or its staff.
Thus, Business and Professions Code subsections 2352(e)
and (f), as interpreted by the Diversion Program, are uncon
stitutional. They improperly delegate state police power to
private parties, and fail to establish standards to guide the
exercise of that power. The statutes should be repealed; state
police power decisionmaking should be reserved to duly ap
pointed Medical Board members and its employed profes
sional staff.
• Antitrust Concerns. Generally, state and federal anti
trust laws preclude combinations in restraint of trade (such
as collusion or agreement by entrepreneurs to exclude others
in competition).63 An agreement by entrepreneurs to exclude
those in competition (which may be accomplished by enforc
ing a barrier to entry into a profession or by excision from the
profession through the enforcement process) is termed a
"group boycott" or "concerted refusal to deal." Such behav
ior, where horizontal in nature, is often considered to be a per
se violation of federal antitrust law.64

8

Where carried out by combinations of competitors ap
pointed to state occupational licensing boards, such
anticompetitive activities are permitted only if they meet the
"state action" test.65 To qualify for so-called "state action im
munity" from the application of federal antitrust law, chal
lenged activities must meet both prongs of a two-pronged
test: ( l ) the restraint of trade must be clearly articulated in
state law with the purpose to displace competition; and (2)
the restraint must be subject to "active state supervision" by
independent officials.66
The restraint of trade at issue here is the participation of
the members of the DECs (private parties, three-fifths of
whom are physicians) in one of the primary police power
functions of the Diversion Program-unilateral decision
making as to the tenns of a Diversion Program participant's
contract and the exercise of his/her professional license. Even
assuming this activity meets the first prong of the two-part
test described above (in that it is "clearly articulated" in Busi
ness and Professions Code subsections 2352(e) and (f)),67 the
major issue relates to the second prong of the "state action"
immunity test: the requirement of active and independent state
supervision. Again, this concept rests with the basic notion
of unlawful delegation (see above). Even if it wants to do so,
"the state" (here, the Legislature and the Medical Board) may
not delegate to private interests the role of guardian over a
restraint of trade which benefits them. In the leading case of
Midcal,68 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a California
law allowing liquor distillers to set resale prices and submit
them to a state agency (the Department of Alcoholic Bever
age Control) for approval. The Court voided the law because
the agency, which was required to review the proposed prices
on behalf of the general public, routinely rubberstamped the
prices submitted by the distillers without exercising bona fide
independent supervision.
Here, "the state" (the Legislature) has apparently autho
rized the DECs to exercise state police power in subsections
2352(e) and (f). However, "the state's" job is not finished.
Under Midcal, "the state" (the Medical Board) must also ex
ercise "active supervision" over the activities, recommenda
tions, and decisions of the DEC. As noted above, no one at
the Medical Board reviews or ratifies DEC decisionmaking
regarding the terms of Diversion Program contracts. Nor,
under Midcal, may such supervision be perfunctory. It must
be actual and active supervision, with control and actual
decisionmaking vested in public officials accountable to the
body politic from which the exercised power derives. Clearly,
the second prong of the Midcal test is not met, and the Medi
cal Board is exposing itself to significant antitrust liability.
The Secrecy Which Shrouds the
Diversion Program

The Diversion Program operates in absolute confidenti
ality. The Program and its supporters argue that such confi
dentiality is absolutely essential in order to attract impaired
physicians into the Program. However, that intended result
has not come to pass-only 200-240 physicians have ever
been enrolled in the Program at any given time since 1980.69
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Consumers should be able to learn whether their physishould have had a participation rate of at least 2,000 physician is abusing or addicted to drugs or alcohol, but no such
cians. The Program-with its "graduation" of only 623 phyinformation is forthcoming from the Medical Board. Andsicians since 1980, and the unknown whereabouts of289 participants who have "unsuccessas mentioned above, the Program
------·--- - - - -·- --- -------maintains confidentiality of phyfully terminated" from the proC o ns umers should be able to learn
gram since 198072-is not even
sician participation not only from
whether
their physician is abusing or
touching the tip of this very danthe public, but from the Board's
addicted to drugs or alcohol, but no such
gerous iceberg. At best, the Proown Enforcement Program. This
information is forthcoming from the
. gram c an be said to have adis particularly troublesome when
i dressed 10--15% of the problem.
the Diversion Program requires a . ___ -"°'�!i�al B oar�:____
participant to agree not to pracWhen questioned by DMQ
tice medicine, but does not communicate such agreement to
members about the Program's low participation level, Diverthe Enforcement Program. If Enforcement thereafter receives
sion Program staff frequently note that participation is a "hard
sell" because of the Program's structural location within the
a complaint or report about such a physician which indicates
Medical
Board; according to staff, physicians perceive that the
that the physician is in fact practicing medicine, it will not
detect this violation of the agreein-house Diversion Program may
ment. Nor will the Diversion Pro- - · ·- ---- ·
--- --·· ·-· ·
be too closely connected to the
At best, the Program can be said to have
gram, because it has no monitorBoard's Enforcement Program.73
addressed I O- I S% of the problem.
Nor has the Program develing mechanism to detect whether
--· ··-· · - ··--- - - --····· ·· · ·- · · -·· --·
---ician
to
agreed
has
who
oped
mechanisms to detect
a phys
chemical dependence or symptoms thereof. While other states'
cease practice has in fact resumed practice.
If the Diversion Program had a sterling record of effeclicensure renewal forms require the self-disclosure of, for extiveness and accountability, some level of secrecy might be
ample, recent charges or convictions of drug- or alcohol-retolerated. However, as noted above, three separate state aulated offenses, MBC's license renewal form does not seek
dits of the Program during the 1980s all found that the monithat information.
toring provided by the Program is deficient,70 and no aspect
No Required or Presumed Practice Cessation
of the Program has been meaningfully changed since then.
Unlike the Board of Registered Nursing74 and medical
Because there is confidentiality, there must be accountabil
boards in other states,75 MBC's Diversion Program does not
ity. However, instead of confidentiality and accountability,
require a temporary cessation of medical practice during the
the Medical Board's Diversion Program suffers from no ac
extensive evaluation necessary to determine the extent of
countability and consumers suffer from its confidentiality.
chemical dependency, inpatient or outpatient treatment, or the
Operational Deficiencies within the
early and fragile stages of recovery.
After contacting MBC's Diversion Program, a prospec
Diversion Program
tive participant is interviewed within two to three days by a
Other flaws plague the Medical Board's Diversion Progroup facilitator or case manager. Group meeting attendance
gram, due largely to the absence of _ _ -··· ··· . .. .. _ .. _ .. .. . -· · __ ..
begins fairly quickly. Consul_ . _ . ____ _
strong Program oversight by the Di•
tation among group facilitaMBC's 0.1vers1on p rogram d oes n o t
vision of Medical Quality. These de•
•
tors, case managers, and medirequtrf a temporary cessation of m-.1
�-''cal
•
ficiencies are briefly catalogued be•
cal consultants at the Medical
practice during the extensive evaluation
low.
Board's
diSlrict (regional) of' necessary to determine the extent of
fices
begins
to flow, and a
chemical dependency; inpatient or
MBC Has Few Mechanisms to
group consensus develops as
outpatient treatment, or the early and
Detect Chemical Dependence
to
what kind of physical, psyfragile,stages of recovery.
As described above, the Diver- ·----------- �---�- �-�----------- chiatric,
psychological, neuro-.
-~·__
··-·
_
_
_
__
-·
~•~
____
- sion Program offers several "carrots"
logical, competency, or other
to entice drug- and alcohol-dependent physicians into par
evaluations the participant should undergo during the next
ticipation-including immunity from disciplinary action for
several weeks. Within the next several months, the partici
self-abuse of drugs or alcohol, and confidential participation
pant appears before the Diversion Evaluation Committee,
(neither the Board's Enforcement Program nor inquiring con
which fashions the individualized agreement and gives the
sumers will be told of the participation of physicians who
participant five days in which to sign it. During this entire
self-refer into the program). However, neither of these mecha
time period, however, the participant is usually free to prac
nisms has succeeded in luring more than 200--240 physicians
tice medicine (including writing prescriptions); his/her license
into the Program at any given time in its 19-year history.
remains unrestricted and unfettered. The only assured moni
Statistically, at least 3,500--4,000 physicians actually experi
toring of that physician is achieved via a group facilitator
enced drug or alcohol addiction during that period.71 To have
who conducts twice-weekly group meetings, and twice
meaningfully addressed this problem, the Diversion Program
monthly urine tests. The Program lacks a requirement or even
--·-··
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the Program lacks a meaningful enforcement mechanism to
detect whether physicians who are dangerous, have been asked
not to practice, and have agreed not to practice have in fact
resumed practice (including the prescription of drugs for him/
herself or others). This is particularly troublesome. Theoreti
cally, the Diversion Program has identified a very dangerous
Frequency of Required Urine Testing
physician-one who is probably using drugs or alcohol and
Prior to May 1998, Program policy required participants'
is a threat to patients-and has secured his/her agreement not
urine to be tested only twice per month-and one of those
to practice. But nothing and no one in the Diversion Program
tests occurred at a regularly-scheduled group meeting which
can detect whether that physician is in fact practicing.77 And,
could easily be anticipated by the
as noted above, if the Board's En
participant. A random urine test
forcement Program receives a
The Diversion Program has no monitoring
was required to be conducted only
complaint about that physician
mechanism to ensure that a physician who
once per month. In response to
which indicates that the physician
has· agreed not to practice medicine has in
CPIL criticism of this practice, the
is practicing medicine, it will
fact ceased practice.
_
Diversion Program abruptly (and
_
___
_ _ _ , never know that the complained------- -- ----of physician is a Diversion Pro
without discussion, review, or
gram participant who has agreed not to practice. For the most
ratification by the Division of Medical Quality) changed its
dangerous physicians who have been asked not to practice,
policy to require two random tests per month.
the Diversion Program has no meaningful detection mecha
This policy-even the changed policy-is insufficient
nism to ensure compliance.
to provide adequate public protection from physicians who
are permitted to practice medicine and are at risk of relapse.
The Program Lacks a Policy for Handling Relapse
Physicians who are admitted alcoholics or addicts, who are
DMQ has adopted very few regulations to implement the
at the early stages of recovery, and who are permitted to con
Diversion Program's enabling act.78 Of particular concern, it
tinue practicing medicine should be random-tested several
has failed to codify any policy whatsoever on its approach
times per week to ensure that they have not relapsed.
toward
relapse (also called, in rehabilitation parlance, a "slip"
The DECs"'Monitoring" of Diversion Program
or "remission interruption"). Because of this failure, DECs
Participants
lack standards to guide decisionmaking on whether to termi
nate a participant from the program for failure to comply with
The DECs are not structured or resourced to provide ad
the contract.
equate monitoring of Diversion Program participants. As noted
Many physicians who finally enroll in the Board's Di
above, DEC members are volunteers with other jobs and live
version
Program have "flunked out" of other rehabilitation
lihoods. The DECs meet only once every three months, and
programs,
and do so only because they know that their prac
must determine (a) whether a physician should be formally
tice
is
at
risk,
that their drug/alcohol abuse will eventually be
admitted into the Diversion Program, and (b) whether the phy
detected by patients, colleagues,
sician should be permitted to prac- ·· -- -•-.- · --· ··
or
co-workers, and that they will
tice medicine, and under what conThe
approach
of
DMQ
a
nd
its
Diversion
become
the subject of complaints
ditions, on the basis of one meet
ro
gram
should
not
be
a
"touchy-f
eely"
to
the
Medical
Board. Participa
P
ing with the participant. Of signifi
tion
in
the
Diversion
Program
coddling
of
addicts,
because
these
are
not
cance, the DECs may not initially
should
be
the
physician's
last
ordinary
addicts.
meet with the participant (or ap------------------------- -- - ----chance-not
the
first
chance
in
plicant for participation) for sevwhich
violations
of
the
contract
terms
are
repeatedly
toler
eral months after the initial application; prior to this meeting,
ated. The approach of DMQ and its Diversion Program should
it is unclear exactly who is meeting face-to-face with the ap
not be a "touchy-feely" coddling of addicts, because these
plicant, who is deciding whether the physician is capable of
are
not ordinary addicts. These addicts are physicians-phy
safe practice during rehabilitation, and whether that person is
sicians
who retain a full and unrestricted license to practice
qualified to make that determination. Further, after the initial
medicine
in California, a full and unrestricted license to cause
meeting, the DECs do not routinely meet with participants. All
irreparable
harm to the people of California. Nevertheless,
further "monitoring" is performed by group facilitators, with
Diversion
Program
documents contain repeated references
occasional observation by the case managers.
to uncomfortably lax policies which apparently permit re
Program Monitoring of Participants Who Have
peated relapse without penalty:
• "Problem cases that cannot be resolved with the case con
Agreed Not to Practice
sultant are brought to the attention of the DEC for changes
The Diversion Program has no monitoring mechanism
in the physician's Diversion Agreement."79
to ensure that a physician who has agreed not to practice medi
• "The case managers regularly review their cases to
cine has in fact ceased practice. The DEC may ask a danger
identify any which may have compliance issues. If any
ous physician to voluntarily refrain from practice. However,

a presumption that participants will be asked to immediately
cease practice during assessment, treatment, and the early
stages of recovery; further, it lacks standards upon which such
a decision should be made by any of the various Diversion
Program "players."76

.
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participant is found to be out of compliance, the case
manager will examine the physician's recovery program
and work closely with the group facilitator to discover
what is going on. When problems arise, necessary action
is taken promptly."80
• "The case managers have incorporated several pro
cedures to improve the documentation of cases. Notes
are prepared at the bottom of each positive urine test
that indicates the action taken and whom they con
tacted to assist them in deciding the action. They are now
preparing a written report of all unusual incidents related
to a case."81
• "Each Diversion [Evaluation] Committee meets four
times a year. The meetings are held to assess physicians
for entry into the Program, determine if a participant
is ready to graduate from the Program, and to deal
with participants who are not in compliance with their
Diversion Agreement."32

F E A T U RE ARTI CLE

use of 12-step programs" in the required group sessions. 84 If
the purpose of the program is therapeutic, the persons pro
viding such therapy should be licensed by the state in a rel
evant field (e.g., licensed as a psychiatrist, psychologist, li
censed clinical social worker, marriage/family/child counse
lor, or certified as a drug and alcohol abuse counselor). How
ever, not all of the group facilitators "employed" as indepen
dent contractors by the Diversion Program are licensed thera
pists; nor is it clear whether the Diversion Program even re
quires licensure of its group facilitators. Simply put, if the
purpose of the Program is therapy, the Medical Board is au
thorizing the unlicensed practice of therapy. In failing to clarify
the primary role of the Diversion Program, and in permitting
unlicensed persons to engage in therapy, DMQ is exposing
patients to severe risk and the state to significant liability. 85
Method of Payment to Group Facilitators

Group facilitators are not MBC employees, but independent contractors to the Diversion Program. They are paid directly by Diversion Program participants, at a rate of $235
The Diversion Program's toleration of repeated violaper
month for twice-weekly group meetings, or $165 per
tions of contract terms is a clear violation of Business and
Profession Code section 2229,
month for once-weekly group
_______
�-------�-,
meetings.
Depending on the numwhich states that protection of the
1
Consumers
sh�uld
not
be
requ
.-ed
t<>
i
ber
of
participants
for any indipublic is the highest priority for
tolerate
drug/alcohol
abuse
by
their
vidual
group
facilitator,
the
the DMQ in exercising its discibe
surely
should
not
c
ans,
and
they
phys
i
i
facilitator's
income
for
conductplinary authority: "In exercising
required
tolerate recidivism after •
ing two 1 .5-hour meetings per
[its] disciplinary authority, ... the
second chance. If the Diversion Program
week could be quite hefty. A 1993
division ...shall, wherever possible,
does, it_ �-!��� be abolishe�
investigative report found that
take action that is calculated to aid
_:__ _ __ . _ ____ ____ .
one of the Program's group faciliin the rehabilitation of the
tators was making over $7,000 per month for conducting two
licensee ....Where rehabilitation and protection are inconsisgroup meetings per week.86 It is arguable that this method of
tent, protection shall be paramount." In admitting a licensee
direct payment could cloud the facilitator's objectivity, beinto the Diversion Program and refraining from disciplining
cause reporting a participant's noncompliance with the terms
that licensee, the Board is "taking action that is calculated to
of his/her contract to the DEC or the Diversion Program Manaid in the rehabilitation of the licensee." But in tolerating reager might lead to termination of a paycheck. CPIL has long
peated violations of the contract, the Diversion Program is
urged the Diversion Program to
violating the last sentence of sec--·-- ·- -- ·-----·-- ··--· -·-- '"-· -- · - -- - · ·-,-- change the method of payment to
tion 2229-the rehabilitation ef.
owever•the
.
.· program does not mon. ito· r t ,, group fac1. 1Itators.
For examp1e,
shave fru1ed , and the ..para1orts
. .
.
. .
or tr·--t. ••graduat�du-part1c1pants i n. any _ ·, partlc1pants
,, . .
Id
cou
wnte
a check
mount pnonty of publ"1c protec.
its 69% .,su�cess rate" fic,ure i5 a
am
and the
to
the
Diversion
Pro
tion is violated if the Program fails
gr
�� wi thout stgnificance«
. .
s_...»wC:
; , ..
f
T
Pr
Id
pay
cou
1tators
ac1
ogram
a
to report the participant to E n- ___ --- ___ _ :_ _
_
_
-- __ ____ __ _ ___ - __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ ,
flat rate based on a range number
forcement after recidivism. Conof participants, to eliminate this potential conflict of interest.
sumers should not be required to tolerate drug/alcohol abuse
However, the Diversion Program has declined to change the
by their physicians, and they surely should not be required to
payment method for group facilitators.
tolerate recidivism after a second chance. If the Diversion
Program does, it should be abolished.
The Program's ••success Rate"

to

l_H_ _ __-ll'l._ ·- .- ·

Unlicensed Practice ofTherapy

Neither the Legislature nor the Medical Board has ever
clarified whether the primary purpose of the Diversion Pro
gram is monitoring or therapy.83 This is a significant distinc
tion-especially in terms of the qualifications of persons hired
to administer the program. Diversion Program documents cir
culated in 1 993 indicated that the group facilitators who con
duct group meetings on the local level are expected to pro
vide "recovery-oriented psychotherapy which focuses on the

The Medical Board constantly advertises a 69% (or there
abouts) "success rate" for participants of the Diversion Pro
gram. This means that 69% of the physicians who are admit
ted to the Program actually complete it by attending group
meetings for three years87 and demonstrating sobriety and a
commitment to a sober lifestyle.
However, the Program does not monitor or track "gra
duated" participants in any way, so its 69% "success rate"
figure is a statistic without significance. At a 1998 national
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many are motivated to join the Program because of pending
conference on health professional diversion programs,88 Dr.
Richard Fuller from the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse
(or perceived possible) disciplinary charges; (2) many are able
and Alcoholism admonished some programs for "lying with
to practice medicine during rehabilitation-such that they can
afford the cost of private monitoring programs; and (3) there is
statistics" about their "success rates," and revealed the ways
in which health care boards misleadingly calculate their "suc
little assured tracking of either those participating in the Pro
cess rates": (1) they track and report only on graduates who
gram or those who drop out of the Program.
have a good prognosis (e.g. , a stable family environment, em
CPIL is torn between recommending wholesale
ployment, an intact social structure) and who are likely to
privatization of the rehabilitation process or retention of the
stick with their commitment to soDiversion Program within the
briety; (2) they report only on
Medical Board with significant
CPIL is torn between reco mmending
"easily located" graduates; this
enhancements to protect the pub
wholesale privatizatio n of the rehabi
inflates the "success rate" because
lic. In CPIL's view, the existing
litatio n p ro cess o r reten ti o n o f the
those who are easily located are
Diversion Program is the worst of
Diversion Program within the M edical
generally doing better than those
both worlds. It is a private reha
Board with significant enhancements to
who are difficult to locate; (3)
bilitation program functioning
protect the pu�lic. In CPIL's view, the
they keep the follow-up period as
within a public agency-a public
existing
Diversi_o_n Program is the worst of
short as possible, e.g. , three
agency which grants immunity
both worlds.
months or shorter; (4) they avoid
from prosecution for certain of
control or comparison groups; (5)
fenses and which engages in in
they use a liberal definition of "success"; and (6) they rely
adequate monitoring both for resumed drug/alcohol use and
solely on self-reporting by the graduate; they don't require
for resumed practice where such practice has been curtailed
drug tests or talk to workplace monitors or others in a posi
all of which is cross-subsidized with public money.
tion to be candid. Dr. Fuller stated that a credible "success
Obviously, the Legislature could repeal the statutes cre
rate" would be based on a yearlong (at least) follow-up of all
ating the Diversion Program and get the Medical Board out
program graduates (not just the easily located ones) which is
of the business of personal rehabilitation. If it chooses to re
not based solely on self-reporting and includes random drugs
tain the program within the Medical Board, the Legislature
tests and interviews with workplace monitors and others who
should strengthen the Diversion Program statutes as follows:
come in contact with former diversion program participants.
• New laws should require Diversion Program partici
The Medical Board's Diversion Program doesn't bother
pants to agree, as a condition of admission into the Pro
with any postgraduate monitoring whatsoever. It simply
gram, to cease the practice of medicine at least during
claims a 69% "success rate" based on completion of a basic
required multidisciplinary physical and mental evalua
program which involves very little monitoring and only two
tions, any necessary inpatient or outpatient drug/
random urine tests per month. Such a claim is meaningless.
alcohol treatment, and the early stages of recovery. The
new laws should also require participants to agree to
Suggestions and Solutions
be referred to the Enforcement Program should they
Preliminarily, CPIL is not convinced the State of Califor
breach any term or condition of their Diversion Pro
nia should be involved in the personal rehabilitation of a phy
gram contract.
sician, a lawyer, or any other regulated licensee. Rehabilita
• New laws should require DMQ to take immediate action to
tion is primarily a private sector function. Many private sector
adopt regulations to guide the administration of the Diver
organizations offer drug rehabilitation programs, including pro
sion Program, especially in the following areas: (1) the de
grams specifically tailored for
velopment of substantive criteria
professionals. There is no rea
governing
a physician's readiness to
DMQ should be requ i red to ado p t
son for state licensing boards
return to medical practice; (2) a com
protocols, pro c edures, a n d reporting
to duplicate what the private
prehensive policy on the Program's
requirements about the decisionmaking of
sector is adequately providing.
response to relapse;89 (3) the devel
the D iversion Program which staff must
If a state licensee has problems
opment of substantive criteria for
follow, and to develop intrusive mo nitoring
with drugs or alcohol which af
conduct
which warrants termination
mechanisms
t
o
enable
t
h
e
Divisio
n
to
fect his/her competence and
from
the
Program; and (4) the fre
ensure
that
staff
is
in
fact
f
ollowing
them.
thereby threaten the safety of
quency of required urine testing.
his/her patients or clients, it L _____ ---·-·-·- --·- . - ----- �- . -·
• DMQ should be required to adopt protocols, procedures,
seems that the state s role is to take the license until the lic
and reporting requirements about the decisionmaking of
ensee proves him/herself capable of practicing safely. The lic
the Diversion Program which staff must follow, and to
ensee is free to avail him/herself of any number of private re
develop intrusive monitoring mechanisms to enable the
habilitation services, and resume practice if and when he/she
Division to ensure that staff is in fact following them.90
proves to the state that he/she is sober and capable of safe prac
The Legislature should require DMQ to create a Standing
tice. It is unclear why the state, at public expense, must bear
Committee on the Diversion Program within DMQ, and
the cost of the licensee's rehabilitation-particularly when (1)
12
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charge it with continuous and comprehensive monitoring
of the Diversion Program.

• The Legislature should repeal or substantially amend the
statutes creating DECs to clarify that DECs are advisory
bodies which have no authority to exercise state police
power. Diversion Program staff, directly accountable to
the Medical Board's Executive Director and to DMQ for
implementing DMQ- adopted policies and protocols,
should make all decisions about the terms and conditions
of a participant's contract and continued participation in
the Diversion Program.
• The Legislature should require the Program to monitor
physicians who have agreed not to practice, to ensure
that-in fact-they do not practice (including the prescrib
ing of drugs). New laws should require that the identity of
physicians who have agreed not to practice be communi
cated to MBC's Enforcement Program to ensure that vio
lations of that agreement can be detected via consumer
complaints or reports by employers .
• The Legislature should require the Medical Board to re
vise its license renewal form to require renewal applicants
to disclose, under penalty of perjury, whether they have
been charged with or convicted of offenses involving drugs
or alcohol during the prior renewal period; and to develop
other methods of obtaining information about drug- and
alcohol-related problems or misconduct by licensees.
• The Legislature should reiterate that all Diversion Pro
gram group facilitators providing therapy must be licensed
therapists or certified drug and alcohol abuse counselors.
• New laws should specify that group facilitators be paid a
flat rate for conducting group meetings for Diversion Pro
gram participants; and should require Diversion Program
participants-to the extent possible, and especially when
they are permitted to practice medicine-to pay a much
greater share of the overhead costs of the Program than
they currently do.
• The Legislature should require the Diversion Program to
track all "graduates" for at least one year after release from
the Program, to determine the effectiveness of the Pro
gram in helping physicians to maintain sobriety. This post
graduate tracking should include self-reporting; interviews
with family members, workplace monitors, and others who
come in contact with former Diversion Program partici
pants; and random drugs tests. The Program should also
track former participants who have "terminated unsuccess
fully" from the Program. These data should be examined
annually by DMQ and the Legislature, and should be the
basis for future decisionmaking about the fate of the Di
version Program.
• Finally, the Legislature should instruct the Bureau of State
Audits (formerly the Office of the Auditor General) to take
another independent look at the actual practices of the Di
version Program, to determine whether the Program has
rectified the very serious problems first identified in 1 982.

F EATURE ARTI CLE
Conclusion

Despite the number and severity of the problems de
scribed above, the Diversion Program continues to exist. Fur
ther, it has recently been given jurisdiction over other types
of problem cases, and pending legislation would give it even
more responsibility-without any significant change in its
structure or operations.
Since January 1 , 1 997, Business and Professions Code
section 821 .5 has established a new reporting route for hos
pital peer review bodies that are investigating physicians
whom they believe to be suffering from "a disabling mental
or physical condition that poses a threat to patient care." In
stead of referring these reports to the Medical Board's En
forcement Program under Business and Professions Code
section 805, new section 821.5 requires peer review bodies
to report these cases to the Diversion Program, and the Pro
gram Manager must periodically contact the peer review body
to monitor the progress of the investigation.91 Between Janu
ary 1 997 and June 1 998, 26 such investigations were reported
to the Diversion Program.92
And at this writing, Senate Bill 1 045 (Murray)-spon
sored by the California Medical Association-would amend
Business and Professions Code section 805, which currently
requires hospital peer review bodies to report a physician's
resignation or leave of absence "following notice of an im. pending investigation" to the Medical Board's Enforcement
Program; such leaves are often taken to enable the physician
to enter inpatient drug/alcohol treatment. SB I 045 would con
vert such reports from section 805 reports to the Enforce
ment Program into section 821 .5 reports to the Diversion Pro
gram if a physician takes a leave of absence in order to enter
into a drug/alcohol treatment program. Under SB 1 045, the
Diversion Program manager-upon receiving such a report
is required to "review any ongoing m onitoring program ... [to]
ensure that it is adequate to protect the public, that it includes
the requirement that all other hospitals where the physician
has privileges are notified of the agreement, and that any vio
lation of the monitoring requirements are reported to the di
version program administrator. At the discretion ofthe diver
sion program administrator; a physician... who repeatedly vio
lates a monitoring agreement may be required to participate
in the diversion program of the Medical Board of Califor
nia."93 In other words, the M edical Board's Enforcement Pro
gram is deprived of all information about a potentially dan
gerous drug- or alcohol-abusing physician, and that physi
cian may be given many more "bites of the apple" than he/
she is currently entitled to receive.
The Diversion Program is significantly flawed. Because
of the secrecy which shrouds the Program, the utter lack of
any substantive standards which guide Program decision
making, the Program's own failure to comply with state law
requiring comprehensive reporting about its decisions and its
cost, and the Division of M edical Quality's wholesale failure
to properly oversee the Program, it is impossible for anyone
to determine whether Diversion Program protects the public
from the state's most dangerous physicians.94 Yet that is
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exactly what the Legislature has demanded of the Medical
Board in Business and Professions Code sections 2229 and
2340. The Legislature should not consider any bill referring
more cases to the Program without restructuring the Program
and requiring the Division of Medical Quality to take proper
and accountable ownership of it. The Medical Board's Di
version Task Force is midway through a comprehensive re
view of the Program, and should be permitted to complete its
work and make its recommendations without having to con
tend with new changes to the Program. The question for the
Legislature is whether to retain the Program within the Medi
cal Board and, if so, how to restructure it; not whether to add
new responsibilities to the ones it has proven it cannot handle.
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Diversion Program; Some Problems Remain (Report No. P576) (Sacramento, CA; June 1 986); Office of the Auditor
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ramento, CA; Aug. 13, 1982).
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of Medical Quality Assurance (Report No. P--035) (Sacra
mento, CA; Aug. 13, 1982) at 33.
53. Office of the Auditor General, The State's Diversion
Programs Do Not Adequately Protect the Public From Health
Professionals Who Suffer from Alcoholism or Drug Abuse
(Report No. P-425) (Sacramento, CA; Jan. 1985) at 23.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Chet Pelton, et al., Physician Diversion Pro
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ACilVE DRUGS 159 (Apr.-June 1993); Chet Pelton and Richard
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Experience with Recovering Anesthesiologists, 23(4) J. PsYCHO
AcnvEDRUGS 427 (Oct.-Dec. 1991 ); Richard Ikeda, M.D., M.P.A.
and Chet Pelton, Diversion Programs for Impaired Physicians,
152 WESTERN J. OF MEDICINE 617 (May 1990).
56. At each quarterly meeting of DMQ, the Diversion
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Diversion Program statistics and cumulative totals dating since
1 980. The author has witnessed numerous DMQ members
questioning Diversion Program staff as to the whereabouts
of former Program participants who have "terminated unsuc
cessfully"; no answers are ever forthcoming.
57. See infra text at notes 87-88.
58. Note that the DECs have no disciplinary authority
in that they are not authorized to suspend, revoke, or restrict
a participant's license to practice medicine. At most, a DEC
may decide to include a "practice cessation" provision in a
participant's Diversion Program contract; if the participant
refuses to accept the provision, the DEC may deny admis
sion into the Program, thus exposing the licensee to potential
disciplinary action under Business and Professions Code sec
tion 2239. Even if an applicant agrees not to practice medi
cine, the Diversion Program has no meaningful monitoring
mechanism to ensure that physicians who have agreed to stop
practicing medicine have in fact stopped. Additionally, any
such requirement not to practice is not communicated to the
Medical Board's Enforcement Program, and is not disclosed
to a consumer inquiring about the physician's disciplinary
record. See infra text at notes 69-70.
59. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2350(g), 2355.
60. Although Diversion Program staff assert that the
DECs decide whether and when to terminate a participant
from the Program, no statute expressly permits a DEC to ter
minate a Diversion Program participant for noncompliance
with the terms of the Program contract. DMQ's regulations
purport to authorize the DECs to terminate a physician's par
ticipation in the program for a variety of reasons, 16 CAL.
CODE REGS. § 1 357 .5; however, the legislative authority un
derlying these regulations is implied rather than expressed.
6 1 . 2 CAL. JuR. 3D Administrative Law § 40 ( 1995).
62. See generally 1 6A AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law
§ 378 ( 1 998) ("[s]ince generally the legislature may not
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ciations, or corporations, the legislature is without authority
to delegate the exercise of police powers to a private corpo
ration or private citizen..., particularly where there is no state
supervision") (emphasis added). See also Bayside Timber
Company, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County,
20 Cal. App. 3d 1 (197 1) (statutory scheme establishing re
gional forest practice committees composed primarily of pri
vate timber owners and requiring them to both draft the state
Board of Forestry's logging regulations and secure their ap
proval by two-thirds of the private timber owners in each dis
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delegation of state police power authority to private parties
with a vested interest in the content of the rules).
63. 15 u.s.c § 1; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16700 et seq.
64. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
65. Parker v. Brown, 3 17 U.S. 341 ( 1943).
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Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 ( 1980) (hereinafter "Midcaf');
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67. In fact, Business and Professions Code section 2352
may not "articulate" the authority of the DECs to determine
the terms and conditions of a Diversion Program participant's
contract as "clearly" as the Medical Board may think it does.
Section 2352(e) authorizes a DEC to "consider"-not neces
sarily decide-whether a physician participant "may with
safety continue or resume the practice of medicine." Section
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DMQ or a Medical Board employee, the terms and condi
tions under which a physician may practice medicine. Thus,
the DECs' decisionmaking may not even satisfy the first re
quired prong of the Midcal test, and it clearly does not satisfy
the second required prong; see text following note 68.
68. Midcal, supra note 66.
69. At each quarterly DMQ meeting, the Diversion Pro
gram distributes a two-page statistical data sheet indicating,
among other things, the number of current participants in the
Program. As of September 30, 1998, a relatively high num
ber of 23 1 physicians were enrolled in the Program; as of
September 30, 1997, 2 17 physicians were in the program; as
of September 30, 1995, 205 physicians were in the program
(all reports on file at CPIL). See also 15: 1 CAL. REG. L. REP.
(Winter 1995) at 63-64 (MBC member Milkie questions why
average number of Diversion Program participants has re
mained constant at 220-240 for fifteen years).
10. See supra note 5 1.
7 1. The Medical Board of California currently licenses
over 104,000 physicians. Using the most conservative of the
lifetime prevalence estimates presented above, see supra notes
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at least 10,000 California-licensed physicians will experi
ence chemical dependency at some point in their careers. Over
the past twenty years (the approximate age of the Diversion Pro
gram and approximately one-half the length of a physician's ca
reer), the Board probably averaged 70,000 licensees, such that
statistically-3,500-4,000 physicians actually experienced drug
or alcohol addiction during that twenty-year period.
72. Medical Board of California, California Physician
Diversion Program (Sept. 30, 1998) (quarterly statistics pro
vided to the Division of Medical Quality) (on file at CPIL).
13. See 15: 1 CAL. REG. L. REP. (Winter 1995) at 63-64.
74. In the contract used by the Board of Registered Nurs
ing for entry into its diversion program, the applicant must
agree to "cease the practice of nursing until my assessment
process is completed, this agreement is signed and returned,
and I have received an addendum to this agreement follow
ing [diversion program contractor] consultation with the Di
version Evaluation Committee." Board of Registered Nurs
ing, Diversion Program Entry Agreement (Nov. 30, 1992) (on
file at CPIL). This "practice cessation" is not a formal sus
pension, but an agreed-to interruption in practice during evalu
ation, treatment, and the early stages of recovery; the nurse
may not resume practice until authorized by the Diversion
Evaluation Committee. See also 13:2&3 CAL. REG. L. REP.
(Spring/Summer 1993) at 106--07.
75. For example, New York requires a participant to tem
porarily surrender his/her license upon entry into its Diversion
Program. N.Y. Pua. HEAL'IH LAW § 230(13)(a). Pennsylvania
requires participants to sign a "consent agreement" in which
they agree to cease practice during evaluation and treatment.
Forum II, supra note 3, atPart IV (Assorted Contractual Forms)
(Pennsylvania Bureau of Professional and Occupational Af
fairs, Consent Agreement and Order) (on file at CPIL).
76. With regard to standards of debilitation warranting
practice cessation, the Program appears to operate on an "I
know it when I see it" philosophy; see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within [the definition of obscenity]; and per
haps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know
it when I see it...."). By virtue of its absence, DMQ vests
absolute confidence and discretion in the ability of the other
"players" to recognize debilitating chemical dependency and
demand a practice cessation.
77. When confronted with this concern at a July 1994
meeting, Diversion Program staff insisted that the group facili
tators who conduct weekly meetings will somehow be able to
discern that a physician has been practicing medicine, and that
the participant's case manager "knows where the physician has
practiced and hopefully where the doctor has privileges." See
14:4 CAL. REG. L. REP. (Fall 1994) at 66.
78. 16 CAL. CODE REGS. 1357 et seq.
79. Medical Board of California, Diversion Program,
T hird Annual Report (Sacramento, CA; 1996) at 3; see also
Medical Board of California, Diversion Program, Second
Annual Report (Sacramento, CA; 1995) at 4.
80. Medical Board of California, Diversion Program,
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Third Annual Report (Sacramento, CA; 1996) at 6.

8 1. Medical Board of California, Diversion Program,
Second Annual Report (Sacramento, CA; 1995) at 8.
82. Medical Board of California, Diversion Program,
Orientation of Board Members (Sacramento, CA; July 27,
1994) at 2.
83. The Diversion Program is clearly not a treatment pro
gram for drug/alcohol abuse, in that it does not directly pro
vide treatment (other than the counseling provided by group
facilitators at meetings). Whether it provides "therapy" through
twelve-step counseling by group facilitators is unclear; if it
does, the Medical Board is authorizing the unlicensed practice
of therapy because it does not require its group facilitators to
be licensed therapists. At most, it is a monitoring program: It
purports to monitor a participant's compliance with the terms
of the contract which the participant has signed with the Pro
gram. Through the contract (and the threat of license disci
pline for noncompliance with the contract), the Diversion Pro
gram requires each participant, on a case-by-case basis, to seek
specified treatment and engage in specified rehabilitation pro
grams, including attendance at its own group meetings.
84. Medical Board of California, Diversion Program,
Group Facilitator Policies and Procedures (Sacramento, CA;
June 1993) at 2 (on file at CPIL).
85. CPIL brought this issue to the attention of the Di
version Program in May 1993. At that time, a task force of
the Board reviewing the Diversion Program indicated that
"the current facilitators should be allowed to continue with
the Diversion Program even though they are not licensed
therapists or certified drug counselors; however, the current
facilitators who do not meet those criteria should obtain ten
hours of credit each year that could be used toward obtaining
a certificate or license." However, all Diversion Program
group facilitators had not met these criteria by 1995. In a re
port to the Board's Division of Medical Quality, the Diver
sion Program noted: "The five (5) facilitators who lacked ei
ther a therapy license or a CADAC Certificate have been pro
gressing toward their certificate or therapy license. We ex
pect the identified facilitators will obtain their certificate or
license by August 1996." Medical Board of California, Di
version Program, Second Annual Report (Sacramento, CA;
1995). No follow-up on the licensure status of these facilita
tors was provided in the Diversion Program's Third Annual
Report (1996) or any Diversion report thereafter.
86. California Highway Patrol, Bureau of lnternal Affairs,
Administrative Investigation: Medical Board ofCalifornia (In
vestigative Summary) (Sacramento, CA; Jan. 11, 1993) at 25.
87. As noted above, Business and Professions Code sec. tion 2350(g) requires two years of sobriety. However, the
Diversion Program's quarterly reports to DMQ from Septem
ber 30, 1997 through September 30, 1998 state: "To com
plete successfully means that the Diversion Evaluation Com
mittee is satisfied that the participant has been clean and so
ber for a minimum of 3 years.... " No regulation duly adopted
by DMQ has enhanced the statutory requirement to three
years. This may be another example of Diversion Program
staff implementing a Liaison Committee recommendation

without consulting DMQ; it is also a clear case of underground
rulemaking in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), Government Code § 1 1340 et seq., in that it imple
ments a statute and has not been adopted pursuant to the
rulemaking procedures required by APA.
88. Citizen Advocacy Center, Forum on the Regulatory
Management of Chemically Dependent Health Care Practi
tioners (Arlington, VA; Mar. 5-6, 1998).
89. Other states require diversion program participants
to sign a relapse management contract as part of admission
into their programs. These states use forms which require
detailed documentation of each instance of relapse, and at
tempt to quantify or objectify the degree of relapse to assist
in a determination of Program action. See, e.g. , Forum ll,
supra note 3, at Part III (Program Descriptions) (Utah Re
covery Assistance Program Score Sheet for Lapse/Relapse;
Oregon Diversion Program for Health Professionals Proto
col for Relapse Management).
90. In 1985, the Auditor General phrased this goal more
simply: "Finally, to improve the medical board's oversight of
the diversion program, the medical board should develop a
reporting system for the diversion program that will provide
the medical board with enough information to supervise the
program properly." Office of the Auditor General, The State s
Diversion Programs Do Not Adequately Protect the Public
From Health Professionals Who Suffer from Alcoholism or
Drug Abuse (Report No. P-425) (Sacramento, CA; Jan. 1985)
at 32. Fourteen years later, the Medical Board has still failed
to implement this recommendation.
91. "The diversion program administrator shall contact
the peer review body periodically thereafter to monitor the
progress of the investigation. At any time, if the diversion pro
gram administrator determines that the progress of the investi
gation is not adequate to protect the public, the diversion pro
gram administrator shall notify the Chief of Enforcement of
the Division of Medical Quality of the Medical Board of Cali
fornia, who shall promptly conduct an investigation of the
matter." CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CooE § 821.5(b). However, if the
peer review body closes the investigation and "has determined
that there is no need for further action to protect the public, the
diversion program shall purge and destroy all records in its
possession pertaining to the investigation...." Id. at § 821.5(e).
92. Medical Board of California, 1997-98 Annual Re
port (Sacramento, CA; Oct. 1998) at vii.
93. Senate Bill 1045 (Murray), as introduced February
26, 1999 (proposed amendments to Business and Professions
Code section 821.5(c)) (emphasis added).
94 . The Program's supporters frequently state that "no
patient has ever been injured by a Diversion Program partici
pant" and that "Diversion Program graduates are disciplined
less frequently than the general population of physician lic
ensees." We don't know that. No one knows that. No one
not the Program's supporters, not the Medical Board's En
forcement Program, not the victims of injury caused by Di
version Program participants or graduates, and not this au
thor-knows who is or has been in the Diversion Program.
These claims are meaningless and misleading.
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